# EveryBank, N.A. — Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
## "The Average American Bank" — a synthetic institution, 2026-06-30

*Not a real bank. Not the real "EverBank, National Association" (RSSD 2735146) —
that's an actual $46.7B Florida-chartered bank with a distinctive NDFI/warehouse-
lending business, covered separately in this project's cohort report. EveryBank,
N.A. is a fictional entity built by averaging **every one of the 4,297 banks that
filed an FFIEC Call Report for 2026-Q2** — from the smallest ($3M-asset community
bank) to the largest ($4.09 trillion money-center bank) — equal-weighted, one
vote each. Source: `everybank_na.py` / `everybank_report.py` against
`call_reports.db`. Methodology note: derivatives are Schedule RC-L only, not
RC-R Part II — RC-R II is a regulatory-capital risk-weighting schedule that can
and does exclude real derivative positions (confirmed directly: a $12.96B credit-
derivative position at the real EverBank, N.A. shows up in full on RC-L and is
entirely absent from RC-R Part II's notional tables). RC-L is the complete record.*

---

## A note on what "average" means here

Two very different banks are both true at once:

- **The mean bank** has $6.17B in assets. This is what you get from literally
  averaging all 4,297 balance sheets — and it's real, in the sense that if
  you took every dollar on every Call Report and split it evenly across 4,297
  bank charters, this is the charter you'd get. But it's dollar-heavy: total
  system assets are $26.5 trillion, and a small number of trillion-dollar
  banks pull this number far above what a typical bank looks like.
- **The median bank** has **$384 million** in assets — sixteen times
  smaller. This is the bank you'd hit if you lined up all 4,297 institutions
  by size and picked the one exactly in the middle. It's a far better answer
  to "what does a normal American bank look like."

This document presents EveryBank, N.A. primarily at **mean scale** (since
that's literally what "averaging all banks into one" produces), with the
median called out wherever the gap changes the story. Every line also shows
what fraction of all 4,297 banks report *any* nonzero value for it — for
anything beyond a plain community-bank balance sheet, that coverage number
is the real finding, because most lines on this "average" bank are actually
zero at the median institution and only nonzero at a minority of (mostly
large) banks.

---

## Schedule RC — Balance Sheet

| Line | EveryBank, N.A. (mean) | % of assets (mean) | Median bank | % of assets (median) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total assets** | **$6,166.2M** | 100.0% | $384.2M | 100.0% |
| Total loans and leases | $3,244.0M | 64.8% | $248.6M | 69.4%¹ |
| Total securities (AFS categories, partial²) | ~$730M | ~11.8% | — | — |
| Total trading assets | $327.1M | 0.07%³ | $0 | — |
| Total deposits | $4,423.8M | 82.5% | $322.6M | 85.8%¹ |
| Total liabilities | $5,551.4M | 87.1% | $339.0M | 89.4%¹ |
| **Total equity capital** | **$614.7M** | **12.9%** | $41.2M | 10.6%¹ |

¹ Median column here is the *median of each bank's own ratio*, not (median $)/(median assets) — the more honest way to describe "the typical bank's balance sheet shape."
² Sum of the 8 AFS categories priced individually below; a handful of smaller categories are omitted from this subtotal for space.
³ The mean trading-asset ratio is tiny because only 4.4% of all banks have any trading book at all — see coverage table below.

---

## Schedule RC-C Part I — Loan Book

| Category | Mean $ | % of banks with any | Median % of assets (nonzero only) |
|---|---|---|---|
| SFR 1-4 family | $693.8M | 96.3% | 17.6% |
| C&I | $2,992.0M | 17.6%⁴ | 7.9% |
| CRE, non-owner-occupied | $290.5M | 92.2% | 8.1% |
| CRE, owner-occupied | $165.7M | 91.5% | 7.2% |
| Construction | $105.7M | 90.1% | 3.9% |
| Consumer | $487.7M | 94.9% | 1.4% |
| Agriculture | $49.7M | 81.5% | 4.6% |
| Multifamily | $156.3M | 81.0% | 2.4% |
| Government/municipal | $47.6M | 48.9% | 0.4% |
| Lease financing | $147.7M | 5.4% | 0.5% |
| All other | $291.5M | 14.5% | 0.05% |

⁴ Low "% of banks with any" for C&I looks wrong at first glance — it reflects how this concept map resolves the code (a MAX-coalesce quirk worth re-checking for smaller/streamlined filers specifically; flagged here rather than silently presented as fact, since the dollar-weighted C&I share elsewhere in this project's cohort work runs much higher. Treat this one row with more caution than the rest of the table.)

**EveryBank, N.A.'s loan book is dominated by 1-4 family residential mortgages (~20% of assets) and a broad, unremarkable commercial/CRE mix** — no single category dominates the way NDFI lending dominates the real EverBank, or the way consumer credit dominates Barclays Bank Delaware. This is, structurally, what "plain vanilla, but at 1/150th the scale of the smallest $30B+ CIDI" looks like.

---

## Schedule RC-B — Securities (AFS)

| Category | Mean $ | % of banks with any | Median % of assets (nonzero only) |
|---|---|---|---|
| US Treasury | $284.8M | 47.9% | 2.0% |
| Municipal | $44.8M | 73.6% | 3.9% |
| US Agency | $20.6M | 67.8% | 1.6% |
| Other resi MBS (CMO/REMIC) | $99.9M | 64.0% | 1.9% |
| Resi MBS pass-through | $197.6M | 23.6% | 3.0% |
| CMBS | $63.7M | 46.0% | 1.0% |
| ABS | $19.1M | 12.3% | 0.6% |

**Municipal bonds are the single most universal security holding** (73.6% of all U.S. banks hold some) — more common than Treasuries (47.9%) — consistent with muni bonds' traditional role as the small-community-bank's go-to investment (local tax-exempt income, often tied to the bank's own service area).

---

## Schedule RC-L — Derivatives (notional, RC-L only — see methodology note above)

| Risk category | Mean notional | % of all banks with any | Median notional as % of assets (banks that have any) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interest rate | $203,012M | **12.3%** | 7.7% |
| Foreign exchange | $75,193M | **1.8%** | 0.8% |
| Equity | $10,010M | **0.7%** | 0.3% |
| Commodity | $2,002M | **0.8%** | 3.0% |
| Credit | $6,103M | **3.3%** | 0.7% |

**The headline fact isn't the dollar amount — it's the coverage. ~88% of all U.S. banks report zero derivative notional of any kind, of any type, in any risk category, this quarter.** Derivatives use in American banking is a phenomenon of a few hundred institutions, not a general feature of the system. Where the $30-100B cohort in the main report shows every bank with *some* IR book and about half with something beyond plain-vanilla, EveryBank, N.A. — the true system average — mostly doesn't do derivatives at all.

---

## Schedule RC-L — Off-Balance-Sheet Commitments (selected)

| Category | Mean $ | % of banks with any |
|---|---|---|
| Unused C&I commitments | $662.1M | 89.7% |
| Unused HELOC commitments | $103.1M | 74.3% |
| Financial standby letters of credit | $119.6M | 54.5% |
| Performance standby letters of credit | $14.5M | 30.1% |
| Commercial letters of credit | $4.1M | 11.2% |

---

## Schedule RC-P / RC-S — Mortgage Banking & Servicing (corrected scope)

**Correction applied here that the main cohort report did not originally make**: Call Report code A591 ("outstanding principal balance of loans **OTHER THAN** 1-4 family residential mortgages, serviced for others" — explicitly covers things like credit cards, auto loans, SBA loans per its FFIEC definition) was previously conflated with genuine mortgage servicing (codes B804/B805) in this project's "mortgage banking intensity" measure. Separated here:

| Line | Mean $ | % of banks with any |
|---|---|---|
| 1-4 family mortgages serviced, no recourse (B805) | $2,676.2M | 9.7% |
| 1-4 family mortgages serviced, with recourse (B804) | $30.0M | 4.7% |
| **Genuine mortgage servicing subtotal** | **$2,706.2M** | — |
| Other (non-mortgage) loans serviced for others (A591) | $2,719.0M | 7.1% |
| MSR fair value | $10.4M | 23.8% |

Genuine mortgage servicing and "other loans serviced" (credit cards/auto/SBA/etc.) run at almost exactly the same average dollar scale system-wide — a coincidence at this aggregation level, not evidence they're the same activity. Only 23.8% of banks carry any MSR asset at all (the fair-value discipline this implies is itself a specialized capability most banks don't maintain, even smaller than the 9.7%/4.7% that report any raw serviced-loan balance).

---

## Trust / Fiduciary (Schedule RC-T)

| Line | Mean $ | % of banks with any | Median (nonzero only) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total fiduciary assets | $104,621M | 10.8% | $1,419M ($1.4B) |
| Total custody assets | $705,437M | 9.4% | $87.7M |

The mean here is driven almost entirely by a handful of the largest custody/trust banks in the country (State Street, BNY, JPMorgan-scale institutions) — with 4,297 banks in the denominator, one $10+ trillion custody book moves this average dramatically. **~89% of all U.S. banks run no fiduciary business at all.**

---

## Funding

| Line | Mean $ | % of banks with any |
|---|---|---|
| FHLB advances | $123.9M | 51.8% |
| Repurchase agreements | $134.6M | 14.7% |
| Fed funds purchased | $4.3M | 6.4% |
| Subordinated debt | $11.9M | 1.2% |

FHLB advances are the one wholesale-funding tool that's genuinely widespread (over half of all banks use them) — everything else (repo, fed funds, sub debt) is a minority practice, largely restricted to larger institutions.

---

## Bottom line

EveryBank, N.A. — averaged honestly across the entire U.S. banking system — is a
$6.17B-on-paper, $384M-in-the-middle institution that holds mostly 1-4 family
mortgages and a broad CRE/C&I mix, funds itself overwhelmingly with deposits,
owns some municipal bonds, and does none of the things that fill the rest of
this project's report: no meaningful derivatives book (88% chance of zero), no
trading desk (96% chance of zero), no trust business (89% chance of zero), no
warehouse/NDFI lending, no mortgage-servicing-at-scale operation. The $30-100B
cohort analyzed elsewhere in this project isn't a slice of "regional banking" —
it's the roughly top-1%-by-size stratum where these specialty business lines
start to exist at all.

*A multi-year trend for this same synthetic entity (FinData time series,
2010-2026) is in a companion document once the underlying pull completes.*